

OCA 88-3983
19 December 1988

MEMO MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

FROM: John L. Helgerson
Director of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: New Members of the Intelligence Committee

1. Senator Dole's office has confirmed that the new Republicans on the Senate Intelligence Committee will be Senators D'Amato and Danforth. We still do not know which Democrat will replace Senator Bentsen. (Senator Hollings has been serving an abbreviated term on the Committee that has expired. He has applied for an extension, but Senator Mitchell could deny this and appoint a second new Democrat.)

2. I plan to call on Senators D'Amato and Danforth to introduce myself and [redacted] my Deputy Director for Senate Affairs. In the process I will alert the new Members that you will be inviting them to lunch at CIA Headquarters early next year to provide them an opportunity to meet senior Agency managers. My recommendation would be to have the DDCI, the Executive Director and the four Deputy Directors in attendance.

STAT

3. I plan to follow the same procedure with new Members appointed to the House Intelligence Committee. There will be at least four to five new faces there and I think we should invite them out as a group.

4. Let me know if you have any suggestions regarding this plan of action. I have attached background information on Senators D'Amato and Danforth.

STAT

[redacted]
John L. Helgerson

Attachment

D/OCA/JLH [redacted] (19 Dec 88)

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Missouri - Senior Senator

John C. Danforth (R)

Of Newburg — Elected 1976

Born: Sept. 5, 1936, St. Louis, Mo.

Education: Princeton U., A.B. 1958; Yale U., B.D., LL.B. 1963.

Occupation: Lawyer; clergyman.

Family: Wife, Sally Dobson; five children.

Religion: Episcopalian.

Political Career: Mo. Attorney General, 1969-77; Republican nominee for U.S. Senate, 1970.

Capitol Office: 497 Russell Bldg. 20510; 224-6154.



In Washington: Danforth has earned a considerable amount of respect and goodwill over a decade in the Senate, but he called some of it into question with an unusual performance on the 1986 tax bill that quite a few of his colleagues are still at a loss to understand.

The problem was not that he opposed the conference version of the tax revision bill — so did 22 of his colleagues, few of whom offered as cogent and detailed a set of reasons for their opposition as he did during an eloquent, afternoon-long speech just before the final vote on the measure.

Nor, for that matter, would many senators have found cause for resentment in the fact that he had switched from backing the legislation in the Finance Committee, where he was one of a small group of members who helped Chairman Bob Packwood put the bill together, to opposing the final compromise with the House. The conference committee defeats he had experienced on provisions important to Missouri interests — notably, a tax accounting change harmful to McDonnell Douglas and other major defense contractors in the state — would have been enough to make many members withdraw their support.

It was the manner in which Danforth both supported and opposed the bill that proved disturbing. In both cases, he took a strongly moralistic approach that seemed to suggest that anyone who disagreed with his views was corrupt or dangerous.

The measure Danforth called "the most significant tax reform bill in decades" a few months later became "a very bad bill [that] runs the risk of severe economic damage in the future." Some of his colleagues suspected that Danforth was using a tone of righteous indignation to cover his pique at losing out on his home-state concerns.

Danforth's attitude towards the conference process with the House seemed either disingen-

uous or strikingly naive for so experienced a legislator. Although he had participated in dozens of House-Senate conferences, arranged deals with other legislators and worked out compromises with the House, he seemed personally outraged that the Senate accepted some key House provisions and that agreements were made privately between Packwood and House Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski.

Danforth left the impression that he had entered the conference thinking the Senate bill would somehow emerge untouched. Beyond that, many of the arguments he offered against the conference report could have been made just as well against the original bill, which Danforth had praised in generous terms. As eloquent as Danforth proved to be, he left more than a few senators wondering what was really on his mind.

In the end, of course, Danforth's attack on the bill may earn him a measure of vindication, should the economy turn sour as a result of the tax restructuring. The essence of his argument was that the measure's combination of business tax increases with personal tax cuts would foster immediate consumption at the expense of long-term investment in the economy.

Danforth was active on a wide variety of fronts in the 99th Congress. Perhaps his most visible was as chairman of the Finance Trade Subcommittee. In the surge of congressional concern over the spiraling international trade deficit, he was the leading GOP voice in the Senate seeking a middle ground between the Reagan administration's strict free-trade policy and the increasing appeal of protectionism.

An advocate of free trade when he arrived in the Senate, Danforth grew increasingly concerned over the importation of vast numbers of Japanese autos and the weakening of American

John C. Danforth, R-Mo.

auto manufacturers, some of crucial economic importance to Missouri. At the beginning of the 97th Congress, he and Texas Democrat Lloyd Bentsen introduced legislation to limit the number of autos imported from Japan; it was one of the reasons the Japanese agreed to impose their own voluntary limits.

In the 98th Congress, he helped push through a "reciprocity" measure strengthening the administration's hand in trade negotiations with other countries without imposing strict barriers on imports. By 1985, though, Danforth was angry enough with the Japanese to call for sterner actions. Bitterly criticizing Japan's restrictive trade policies, he proposed a bill to require restraints on imports from Japan if that country did not remove barriers to the sale of American-made goods. Approved by the Finance Committee, the bill signaled the first wave of tough trade sentiment to move through the Senate that year.

But some of the most popular efforts to impose legislative restrictions on imports did not win Danforth's support. He argued against proposals, such as the textile-import quota bill, that singled out specific U.S. industries for protection. Instead, he favored a "generic" approach, under which the basic procedures for resolving trade problems would be strengthened through negotiations among trading partners.

At the same time, Danforth was sharply critical of Reagan's trade stance. He blasted the president for refusing to provide import protections for the hard-hit domestic shoe industry, calling Reagan's decision "a disaster for U.S. trade policy." Danforth said the administration "tends to define anything that walks as protectionism."

Meanwhile, Danforth was serving as chairman of the Commerce Committee, where he had a rocky two years. While he scored some successes, he encountered serious problems on several of the major bills to come before his committee.

Danforth brought a more positive attitude towards federal regulation to the chairmanship than did Packwood, his Commerce predecessor. He had strongly opposed, for example, Packwood's efforts in 1984 to loosen federal broadcasting laws that require radio and television stations to air contrasting views.

Danforth's reluctance to abandon regulation was most apparent on the issue of auto safety. Over the years, he had come into conflict with both the Reagan administration and the auto industry, both of which had tried to reduce federal regulation. He once accused a Reagan-appointed highway safety official of

wanting to "search and destroy" auto safety.

In the 98th Congress, Danforth pushed through legislation increasing regulation of trucks and buses, and pressuring states to curb drunken driving by raising their legal drinking age to 21. He added to that record as chairman, sponsoring a successful bill to set national licensing standards for truck and bus drivers and toughen penalties against drug- and alcohol-related driving convictions.

Danforth made less progress, however, in his efforts to settle the contentious issue of product liability. After the Commerce panel deadlocked in 1985 over legislation to set federal standards for lawsuits on defective products, he proposed a compromise measure aimed at encouraging out-of-court settlements of liability claims. A key feature of his plan called for a \$250,000 limit on awards for pain and suffering in cases in which the plaintiff rejected a pretrial offer from the defendant.

A sharply divided Commerce Committee approved Danforth's bill. But the bill did not reach the floor for months, and when it finally was called up it fell victim to the threat of a filibuster. Danforth was, however, able to secure final passage of a bill making it easier for small businesses and non-profit institutions to join together to provide their own liability insurance.

Danforth also ran into problems with the proposed sale of the CONRAIL system to private enterprise. Working with the administration, he pushed through the Senate a bill allowing sale of the system to the Norfolk Southern railroad. House opposition blocked the idea, however, and Congress eventually agreed to permit sale of Conrail stock to the public.

Danforth's background as an ordained Episcopal priest makes him even more distinctive in the Senate than the snow-white patch he has had in the front of his hair all his adult life. But he makes a conscious effort to play down his unique status. "The people of Missouri elected me to be their senator, not their pastor," he says.

Some of Danforth's legislative efforts reflect the humanitarian and moral ideals that led him into the ministry. Deeply concerned about world hunger, he helped win \$150 million in emergency food aid for Africa after touring the drought-ravaged continent early in 1984. He also has been active in pushing the Reagan administration to step up the pace of nuclear arms reduction talks with the Soviet Union. "The possibility that a nuclear holocaust could occur has become the most important moral issue in human history," he has said.

Missouri - Senior Senator

At Home: A former Wall Street lawyer and Ralston-Purina heir hardly seems the type to represent a state whose political hero is Harry S Truman, champion of the common folk.

Danforth's pedigree was no hindrance in his early political career; he won his first election in 1968 as an outsider, a young insurgent vowing to rid the state attorney general's office of deadwood that had collected during a succession of Democratic administrations.

But after eight years in state office and six more in Washington, Danforth by 1982 was striking many Missouri voters not as a reformer but as a wealthy man distant from their economic concerns. That is why he was nearly ambushed by a clever liberal Democrat who sold herself as a populist under the slogan "Give 'em hell, Harriett."

Well into the election year, Democrats were embarrassed by their failure to find a well-known candidate to challenge Danforth. The entry of state Sen. Harriett Woods brought little cheer to party leaders. She had gained valuable media exposure representing a liberal St. Louis County constituency, but offered a record of questionable appeal to rural and conservative voters and to business interests the Democrats needed to compete with Danforth's campaign spending. Woods supported legalized abortion and opposed efforts to prohibit use of busing as a tool to desegregate schools.

But Woods managed to portray herself as an average working person and hit Danforth as an aristocrat who supported cuts in health care, social services and education. As the only female Democratic candidate for the Senate in 1982, Woods became a priority for women's groups.

Danforth's fund-raising advantage over Woods was more than 2-to-1. But his money and excellent organization were offset by Woods' most important asset: desire. Voters were impressed with her enthusiastic dawn-to-midnight campaigning, while Danforth gave the impression he was not really hungry to be re-elected. More than once, he lamented that the campaign was making it difficult for him to watch the baseball playoffs.

But Danforth's strategy changed abruptly Oct. 15, when the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat's* poll showed the race deadlocked. Less than a month earlier, the newspaper's poll had given Danforth a comfortable lead.

Danforth went on the attack. He called Woods a liberal throwback to an era of discredited Democratic tax-and-spend practices and accused her of demagoguery for portraying the

Republican Party as a menace to Social Security without offering any constructive suggestions of her own. He brought up abortion and busing, topics he had avoided earlier in the campaign.

The shift to a negative campaign had the desired effect. Some conservative Democrats took a second look at Woods and lost their enthusiasm, and complacent Republicans were jolted into realizing that a high GOP turnout would be necessary to keep the seat out of Democratic hands.

Danforth prevailed with slightly less than 51 percent of the vote. Woods won where Democrats usually fare well in Missouri — St. Louis, Kansas City and the majority of rural counties — but in each of those areas, her liberalism cost her just enough votes to enable Danforth to escape.

Despite his 1982 struggle, however, Danforth still enjoys the reputation of being the founder of the modern-day Missouri GOP. Elected state attorney general in 1968 in his political debut, Danforth became the first Republican in 22 years to win statewide office. He lured bright young lawyers to the attorney general's office — among them Christopher S. "Kit" Bond, elected as Missouri's junior senator in 1986 after two non-consecutive terms as governor, and John Ashcroft, who was elected to replace Bond as governor. Danforth also developed a reputation as a protector of consumers and the environment.

In 1970 Danforth was the GOP's only hope to dislodge Democratic Sen. Stuart Symington, who was seeking a fourth term. In an expensive campaign that introduced Missouri to modern media-oriented politics, Danforth won 48 percent of the vote. Two years later, he returned as attorney general by over 450,000 votes, and awaited his next Senate chance.

It came, as expected, when Symington decided to retire in 1976. Democrats appeared to seize the momentum by nominating U.S. Rep. Jerry Litton, described by a state political expert as "one of the most exciting political personalities to come along in years." But Democratic enthusiasm was tragically brief. Litton died in a primary-night plane crash, and Danforth was suddenly the favorite in a contest that had been looking bleak for him.

The state Democratic committee chose as its replacement former Gov. Warren Hearnes, whose courthouse-style administration had been the focus of Danforth's campaign attacks in 1968. Hearnes had finished a poor second to Litton in the primary. Against Litton, Danforth would have had a difficult contest; against Hearnes, he won easily.

*John C. Danforth, R-Mo.***Committees****Commerce, Science and Transportation** (Ranking)

National Ocean Policy Study (ranking).

Budget (9th of 11 Republicans)**Finance** (4th of 9 Republicans)

International Trade (ranking); International Debt; Taxation and Debt Management.

Elections**1982 General**

John C. Danforth (R)	784,876	(51%)
Harriett Woods (D)	758,629	(49%)

1982 Primary

John C. Danforth (R)	217,162	(74%)
Mel Hancock (R)	61,378	(21%)

Previous Winning Percentage: 1976 (57%)**Campaign Finance**

1982	Receipts	Receipts from PACs	Expenditures
Danforth (R)	\$1,766,934	\$572,658 (32%)	\$1,806,350
Woods (D)	\$1,194,854	\$265,151 (22%)	\$1,193,966

Voting Studies

Year	Presidential Support		Party Unity		Conservative Coalition	
	S	O	S	O	S	O
1986	80	20	77	21	82	17
1985	81	17	77	20	70	20
1984	86	13	85	15	83	17
1983	80	16	72	27	64	32
1982	71	19	72	21	76	18
1981	85	13	84	15	83	16

S = Support

O = Opposition

Key Votes

Produce MX missiles (1985)	Y
Weaken gun control laws (1985)	Y
Reject school prayer (1985)	Y
Limit textile imports (1985)	N
Amend Constitution to require balanced budget (1986)	Y
Aid Nicaraguan contras (1986)	Y
Block chemical weapons production (1986)	Y
Impose sanctions on South Africa (1986)	Y

Interest Group Ratings

Year	ADA	ACU	AFL-CIO	CCUS
1986	30	57	33	61
1985	15	65	19	75
1984	35	68	27	63
1983	40	32	13	53
1982	40	50	23	52
1981	25	73	17	89

Alfonse M. D'Amato (R)

Of Island Park — Elected 1980

Born: Aug. 1, 1937, Brooklyn, N.Y.

Education: Syracuse U., B.S. 1959; J.D. 1961.

Occupation: Lawyer.

Family: Wife, Penny Collenburg; four children.

Religion: Roman Catholic.

Political Career: Nassau County public administrator, 1965-68; receiver of taxes, town of Hempstead, 1969-71; Hempstead town supervisor, 1971-77; presiding supervisor, 1977-81; vice chairman, Nassau County Board of Supervisors, 1977-80.

Capitol Office: 520 Hart Bldg. 20510; 224-6542.

New York - Junior Senator



In Washington: D'Amato has taken a tried and true formula for success in local politics — catering to his constituents' every need — and applied it to one of the largest constituencies imaginable: New York state's 17 million people.

It is physically exhausting, and it is not exactly statesmanship, at least not as practiced by such widely admired predecessors in D'Amato's seat as Robert F. Wagner Sr., Herbert H. Lehman and Jacob K. Javits. But it works. Elected to a first term in 1980 by 81,000 votes in a three-way race, he won a second term in 1986 by almost 700,000.

Nearly seven years into his Senate career, D'Amato still operates like the town supervisor he once was. His legislative pursuits are governed by what the voters want, not by any specific philosophical agenda of his own. D'Amato can be genial, but when it comes to protecting New York interests, he is brazen, pushy and persistent — and he is effective.

Less than a month before the 1986 election, as the 99th Congress was striving to finish its work and head home, D'Amato brought business to a halt in an effort to protect the jobs of workers at a Long Island aircraft plant.

As the Senate debated an omnibus appropriations bill it needed to pass to keep the government running, Armed Services Chairman Barry Goldwater proposed halting production of the T-46 trainer airplane, built by the Fairchild Republic Co. on Long Island. Goldwater said cost and quality problems with the T-46 had convinced the Air Force to abandon it in favor of refurbishing the 1960s-era T-37 trainer, built by Cessna.

D'Amato vowed to hold up Goldwater's amendment indefinitely, saying the T-46 had been slandered. "To this product, to this company, this is life or death. . . . I'm not going to

sit by and allow that company to be closed."

Negotiations dragged on through the night of Oct. 16; at noon on the 17th, there was still no airplane compromise and thus no omnibus spending bill, so non-essential federal functions were shut down and workers sent home.

Later that day, the impasse finally was broken. D'Amato won a temporary reprieve for his plane. In the end, however, his work was futile. Both planes ultimately lost out to a third competitor, the T-45, built by McDonnell Douglas.

D'Amato campaigned in 1980 as a hard-line suburban conservative, hostile to inner-city liberal causes, and many feared that as a senator he would carry out Long Island's revenge on Manhattan. It has not turned out that way. Though he supports President Reagan most of the time, he has defied the administration in defense of his urban constituents' interests, especially on transportation issues.

When the administration proposed dramatic cutbacks in mass transit funding in 1982, D'Amato objected fiercely. "There's no way I'm going to be a good old boy and roll along with the team," he said. Five years later, when Reagan needed just one more vote to sustain his veto of a highway and mass transit funding bill, D'Amato was not available. The bill Reagan vetoed contained \$3 billion in mass transit money for New York City, money that D'Amato badly wanted to deliver.

A staunch defender of Urban Development Action Grants (UDAGs), D'Amato was active in the 99th Congress in blocking administration efforts to kill them. He and others sought to broaden the program's appeal by making it easier for smaller, newer cities to receive grants. D'Amato acknowledged that New York might lose some advantage under a new distribution formula, but said, "If you get so greedy that

Alfonse M. D'Amato, R-N.Y.

you want it all for yourself, you run the risk of losing everything."

This "share the wealth" attitude is typical of D'Amato's behavior in the grantsmanship game, which he plays as well as any senator. A member of the Appropriations Committee, he is adept at getting goodies for New York into large, catchall spending bills. He often seeks to enhance their prospects of passage by dealing key senators into the funding action. In a 1986 supplemental appropriations measure, for example, he helped earmark \$55 million for defense research projects at nine universities.

In November 1985, D'Amato failed to get \$32 million extra for the Economic Development Administration to finance four projects to train microelectronic engineers, including one at the Rochester (N.Y.) Institute of Technology. Undeterred, he came back a month later with the same request, but this time he packaged it as part of the Pentagon's research and development budget in an omnibus appropriations bill. The money was approved.

D'Amato found several entrees into one of the most politically popular issues of the last Congress — the battle against illegal drugs. As chairman of the Banking Subcommittee on Securities, he won approval of a measure beefing up federal efforts to detect money laundering, a common ploy of drug traffickers. In May 1986, D'Amato won Senate approval for shifting \$100 million from government furnishings to drug abuse prevention and rehabilitation programs. Onto the major anti-drug bill that cleared in October 1986, D'Amato attached a ban on "ballistic knives," which fire blades up to 30 feet and are, he said, "a favored weapon used by drug dealers."

Meanwhile, D'Amato managed to win publicity all over the country — and on nearly every front page in his home state — by dressing in Army fatigues and accompanying police officers as they staged a drug purchase in Manhattan shortly before the 1986 election.

While Republicans held the Senate, D'Amato's chairmanship of the Securities Subcommittee at Banking put him in a good position to defend the state's financial industry.

D'Amato had to do a careful balancing act when banking and securities industry interests collided during 1984 Senate consideration of bank deregulation legislation. He was the leading critic of one provision opposed by New York City's Citibank and Chase Manhattan. It would have allowed banks in most parts of the country — but not New York — to form regional compacts to prevent banks based outside their region from doing business in their

area. After failing to defeat the proposal in committee, D'Amato waged an unsuccessful weeklong filibuster on the Senate floor.

D'Amato has worked on a wide variety of other financial legislation. A key defender of the tax-exempt status of industrial development bonds, he helped limit restrictions on their use in the 1982 and 1984 tax bills. During the 1986 tax-overhaul effort, D'Amato lobbied against proposals to subject tax-exempt municipal bonds to a minimum tax, opposed efforts to eliminate the tax deduction for state and local income taxes, and fought to preserve the complete deductibility of IRA contributions. The tax bill came down on his side on the first two issues, but not on IRAs.

At Home: D'Amato is the product of one of the last old-fashioned political organizations in the country, the Nassau County Republican party, formerly headed by Joseph M. Margiotta Jr. With county and local officials serving the party directly as fund-raisers and contributors, Margiotta — convicted in 1981 of fraud and extortion — built the Nassau GOP into a wealthy and powerful political machine.

D'Amato's links to the organization are something of a family affair; his father and brother also have long been part of it. D'Amato himself was fresh out of law school when a friend of his father got him a job in the Island Park town attorney's office. He worked his way up through various local offices until he was elected presiding supervisor of Hempstead Township in 1977.

His political skills and his following in Nassau County placed him in line to be county executive and, possibly, Margiotta's successor. Instead, D'Amato decided to run for the Senate in 1980 as a conservative challenger to veteran GOP incumbent Jacob K. Javits. He did so against Margiotta's advice.

D'Amato aggressively sought nomination from the Conservative and Right-to-Life parties, neither of which was fond of Javits. He won both, and Margiotta, breaking with tradition, finally agreed to back him against Javits. D'Amato picked up enough support from downstate Republicans at the state GOP committee meeting to force Javits into a primary.

D'Amato's campaign was controversial from the start. He struck out at Javits as too old (76), too ill — the senator had a progressive motor neuron disease — and too liberal.

Javits fought back by stressing his years of service and airing endorsements from GOP luminaries such as Gerald R. Ford and Sen. Barry Goldwater. But D'Amato was armed with ample funding and a bevy of volunteers. He swept the New York City suburbs and edged

Javits in the city and upstate.

The general election was equally volatile, with Javits still in the contest on the Liberal Party line and Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman the Democratic nominee. Holtzman went after D'Amato, bringing up alleged practices of the Nassau GOP organization. D'Amato denied involvement in anything unlawful, although later he was the subject of three separate investigations. All absolved him of any wrongdoing. Wanting Javits to attract as much of Holtzman's liberal support as possible, D'Amato became much kinder to him. He concentrated on Holtzman, calling her "an absolute witch" for her attacks on him. The election worked out as D'Amato had hoped. Holtzman came within 81,000 votes of him, but Javits took enough votes from her to keep her from winning.

D'Amato's narrow margin of victory in 1980 — and the image as a hard-right zealot he carried from his primary fight against Javits — convinced Democrats that he would be vulnerable in 1986. But by the time the election rolled around, that was not the case. State party leaders had enormous difficulty even finding anyone of stature to challenge D'Amato. His aggressive attention to New York interests had won widespread praise, even from Democrats such as Moynihan and Gov. Mario M. Cuomo.

New York - Junior Senator

Two candidates eventually did emerge. Lawyer and author Mark Green, a former associate of consumer crusader Ralph Nader, had a base among Manhattan liberals. John S. Dyson, former chairman of the state Power Authority, was a millionaire businessman coaxed into the race by members of the Democratic hierarchy seeking a candidate who could foot much of his own campaign bill.

Dyson outspent Green by a massive margin, but Green cast himself as a David against a vote-buying Goliath, and he scored an upset.

In the general election campaign, Green raised questions about D'Amato's activities as chairman of the Banking Subcommittee on Securities (a *Wall Street Journal* article said D'Amato had received generous campaign contributions from Wall Street firms he had aided legislatively), and about D'Amato's ties to the Nassau GOP (D'Amato testified in a summer 1985 trial that charged the organization with coercing financial contributions from county employees seeking raises or promotions).

But D'Amato was never found guilty of any wrongdoing, and the accusations rolled off his back. Reminding voters of his avid efforts to funnel federal funds into the state, he won easily, despite Cuomo's countervailing re-election landslide.

Committees

Appropriations (8th of 13 Republicans)
Transportation and Related Agencies (ranking); Defense; Foreign Operations; HUD-Independent Agencies; Treasury, Postal Service and General Government.

Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (4th of 9 Republicans)
Housing and Urban Affairs (ranking); Securities.

Small Business (4th of 9 Republicans)
Rural Economy and Family Farming (ranking); Export Expansion.

Joint Economic
Economic Growth, Trade and Taxes; Education and Health Investment, Jobs and Prices.

Elections

1986 General
Alfonse M. D'Amato (R) 2,378,197 (57%)
Mark Green (D) 1,723,216 (41%)
Previous Winning Percentage: 1980 (45%)

Campaign Finance

	Receipts	Receipts from PACs	Expenditures
1986			
D'Amato (R)	\$6,523,394	\$855,518 (13%)	\$8,104,587
Green (D)	\$1,640,154	0	\$1,635,676

Voting Studies

Year	Presidential Support		Party Unity		Conservative Coalition	
	S	O	S	O	S	O
1986	77	23	66	32	66	30
1985	71	28	69	28	88	8
1984	68	25	67	25	72	19
1983	67	28	67	30	70	27
1982	71	26	76	22	78	17
1981	82	14	81	13	78	17

S = Support O = Opposition

Key Votes

Produce MX missiles (1985)	Y
Weaken gun control laws (1985)	Y
Reject school prayer (1985)	Y
Limit textile imports (1985)	Y
Amend Constitution to require balanced budget (1986)	Y
Aid Nicaraguan contras (1986)	Y
Block chemical weapons production (1986)	N
Impose sanctions on South Africa (1986)	Y

Interest Group Ratings

Year	ADA	ACU	AFL-CIO	CCUS
1986	35	70	53	56
1985	20	70	62	62
1984	25	85	36	78
1983	20	44	33	63
1982	15	50	46	47
1981	10	64	22	94